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Invasive Species and Natural Function in Ecology 




If ecological systems are functionally organised, they can possess functions or malfunctions. Natural 
function would provide justification for conservationists to act for the protection of current ecological 
arrangements and control the presence of populations that create ecosystem malfunctions. Invasive 
species are often thought to be malfunctional for ecosystems, so functional arrangement would 
provide an objective reason for their control. Unfortunately for this prospect, I argue no theory of 
function, which can support such normative conclusions, can be applied to large scale ecosystems. 
Instead ecological systems have causal structure, with small clusters of populations achieving 
functional arrangement. This, however, does not leave us without reason to control invasive species. 
We can look at the causal arrangement of ecological systems for populations that support ecological 
features that we should preserve. Populations that play a causal role in reducing biodiversity should be 
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‘Your heart has great value to your body. No one would argue that point. Does a 
mosquito population have similar value to a marsh?’ 




There has been a persistent hope that populations in ecological systems have natural 
normativity, just as organs do in a body. Lungs, hearts, and kidneys have a relatively uncontroversial 
interpretation as possessing functions and malfunctions, these are normative in the sense that there is 
something they should be doing. The thought is, if ecological systems are structured so their parts are 
functional for the whole, they possess a type of natural value. This same natural value would allow us 
to say: just as the heart is valuable for the body, the mosquito is valuable for the marsh.  
Natural normativity could facilitate objective judgements about the role of populations within 
ecosystems, whether they are functional or malfunctional. Such ascriptions would then act to mediate 
debates in conservation ethics as to whether populations, which act as parts of a community, aid or 
hinder a community’s interests or perhaps even harm that community. This would provide guidance 
for many thorny environmental ethics questions. In restoration ecology, for example, populations are 
often reintroduced into a region given the assumption they will restore an ecological community’s 
functions. An objective account of function would inform when adding a population is warranted. 
This paper, however, focuses on the question: can function can provide normative guidance as to 
whether we should control invasive species? 
My aims are two-fold. To provide a critical discussion of the theories of ecological function 
and consider whether invasive species are malfunctional for ecosystems given these theories. 
Ultimately, I argue for a limited pluralism towards ecological function. Different types of normative 
function appear in ecological systems, but these are sporadic and rare. Functions in ecology are nearly 
always dispositional, rather than normative, and so are better understood as descriptions of causal 
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structure. However, causal structure can be used to identify features that we should preserve, and this 
can dictate our actions towards invasive species.  
 
2. Natural Normativity and Invasion Ecology 
 
 
“Invasion ecologists are xenophobes” critics of invasive biology have declared (Raffles 2011; 
Winograd 2013; Thompson 2014). They argue there is no sound reason to control invasive species or 
even prefer native species over non-natives. Such preferences are just prejudice, a prejudice not 
always held by the layperson. For example, one critic notes that crafters in Midwest America prefer 
the invasive Oriental Bittersweet, as it is better than native species for constructing wreaths and floral 
arrangements (Sagoff 2005). Locally there is an ongoing debate about the presence of brumbies in the 
Snowy Mountains, with many viewing these invasive horses as a critical part of Australian culture 
and folklore. The critics of invasion biology point to the language occasionally used against invasive 
species (usually in the media) and its similarity to language used in anti-immigration arguments 
(Pearce 2015). With the implicit assumption being anti-immigration is morally wrong, they accuse 
invasion biology as being similarly morally suspect. This debate recently moved into the public 
sphere with popular books and news articles sharing this perspective being targeted to the public 
(Raffles 2011; Winograd 2013; Thompson 2014; Pearce 2015). Invasion ecologists and wildlife 
managers worldwide are feeling the pinch of increasing public scrutiny.  
Why do critics of invasion biology think there is no real reason to control invasive species?  
Mark Sagoff (2005) challenges that there are no traits that explain why non-native species would be 
more “harmful” than natives (p. 219). This, however, requires a prior notion of harm. Once we 
determine what harms ecological systems, we can see whether it is a good heuristic to prevent the 
spread and establishment of non-native species. Concepts of harm or malfunction often inform how 
invasive species ecologists think about the issues (Finnoff et al. 2010; Simberloff et al. 2013). 
Invasion ecologists defend their position by the effects of invasive species on ecological function 
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(Simberloff 2015). Similarly, critics like Mark Davis et al. (2011) state we should rethink invasion 
ecology and that ‘it is time for conservationists to focus much more on the functions of species, and 
less on their origins’ (p. 154).   
These notions of harm and function connect with the environmental ethics literature. 
Functional organisation is a necessary condition for several different ethical justifications for 
preserving holistic ecological systems, and as a result, the control of ‘malfunctional’ species which 
damage these systems. The connection between ‘malfunction’ and environmental ethics is particularly 
clear when ecological communities are treated as if they have health or interests. For example: 
invasive species can be treated as being analogous to a disease, being malfunctional for ‘ecosystem 
health’. While further factors are needed to establish that a dysfunction is a disease, the existence of 
malfunction is plausibly part of what it is to be diseased, and whether someone has a disease is 
normatively relevant to how we should treat them (Wakefield 1992). So, the thought is, if there is an 
objective sense in which populations, such as invasive species, cause ecosystems to act in a 
malfunctional or diseased manner, then it is normatively relevant to how we should respond. J. Baird 
Callicott (1995) defends an ecosystem health realist position, where ecosystems are to be considered 
“nested sets of linked process-functions with temporal boundaries” and, therefore, health “is an 
objective condition of ecosystems” (p. 345). There is, in this view, a real sense in which ecological 
health can be improved or diminished.  
Similarly, there has been a revival of biocentrism, the thesis that “living beings have a good 
of their own because they are end-directed or teleological systems” (Holm 2017, p. 1075). This is 
used to argue for non-anthropocentric reasons to preserve the environment as it contains entities with 
their own interests, who we should not impede (Taylor 1989; Varner 1998; Sandler 2007). 
Biocentrism usually takes organisms to be the right entities for ethical consideration, a position called 
teleological individualism. Recently, John Basl (2017) has argued against teleological individualism 
and that biological collectives, such as ecological systems, should be considered within the ethical 
scope of biocentrists ethical consideration (without himself being a biocentrist) (also see McShane 
2014). Holmes Rolston III argues for biocentrism, claiming organisms are “spontaneous cybernetic 
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system, self‐maintaining with a control center, sustaining and reproducing itself on the basis of 
information” with “a goal” which could provide a “measure of success”. This gives them their own 
self-authored value as they are “evaluative systems” (Rolston III 1988, p. 99). On such biocentrist 
views we should promote and preserve ecological communities’ interests if they similarly satisfy 
these conditions. Philosophers like Lawrence Johnson (1991) argue this case, aiming to establish that 
‘ecosystems have morally significant interests’ and ‘denying that their interests are merely the 
aggregated interest of individual organisms’ (p. 148). Within a biocentrist framework, if invasive 
species impede an ecological community’s interests, we should aid the ecological community by 
controlling these populations. 
The teleological arrangement of ecological systems is only a necessary condition for ethical 
duties within these theories. The environmental ethicist must display both that ecological systems 
have natural normativity and that natural normativity is ethically significant. Natural function is often 
of little ethical consequence, even in organisms that are undoubtable highly functionally organised. 
We kill other organisms, whether plant, animal, or bacteria, for all sorts of reasons with little ethical 
squeamishness. Even when it comes to human health and disease there are some who argue that there 
is no connection between health and natural function (Glackin 2010). This may be an insurmountable 
problem for environmental ethics, but it is not the problem I address. I focus on the prior question of 
whether ecological systems are functionally organised. This matters both as a necessary condition for 
these ethical positions and as means to explicate the functional language used by ecologists in debate 
over invasive species. 
 
3. Naturalized Function in the Sciences 
 
There is a rich and comprehensive philosophical literature attempting to naturalize function. It 
takes teleological statements such as the “heart is for pumping blood” and redescribes them to capture 
the goal directed nature of such statements within a scientific worldview. The goal directed aspect of 
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teleological statements allows for normative inferences; if a heart is not pumping blood then it is 
doing something wrong, in some sense. Prominent normative theories of function include Selected 
Effects functions and Organisational functions. The Australian Melaleuca is invasive in the Florida 
everglades ecosystem. Melaleuca’s dry out their local area through high water consumption and 
exclude other plants through promoting fires, to which they are highly adapted. For the Melaleuca to 
cause the everglades to be malfunctional we need a notion of function that gives us objective 
malfunction, not just a mirror to our preferences for particular biological systems. For a population to 
have one of these normative functions it must possess that function even when it is not preforming it. 
Otherwise, these ‘functional’ relations are equivalent to causal relations. Causal theories of function 
dictate that we can only make statements about whether a functional effect is present or not. We may 
value the existence of this function or disvalue it, but the normativity involved only comes from us. 
So, there would be no sense in which the Melaleuca causes a malfunction, it just stopped the causal 
relations which previously existed in the everglades and we as agents disvalue this. 
Before I place all the vying accounts of function on the table, both normative and 
dispositional, I will dismiss one possibility: there is a single right account of function for ecology. 
Many have argued for the right theory of ecological function to the exclusion of all others in the wake 
of Maclaurin and Sterelny’s (2008) Causal Role community functions, with Nunes-Neto et al. (2014) 
exclusively defending Organisational functions for ecological community’s and Dussault & Bouchard 
(2017) arguing for the superiority of Persistence functions. Monistic stances towards function are 
misguided (Godfrey-Smith 1993; Griffiths 1993; Amundson and Lauder 1994; Garson 2017b). All 
these different theories of function appear to plausibly apply to most organisms, but I argue this is not 
the case in their general application to ecological systems. While organisms – the paradigm cases of 
functional entities – are like ecological communities in that they are diverse in structure, composition, 
and degrees of integration, they are indisputably more stable and tightly integrated than ecological 
systems (Clarke 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2012; Lean 2018). That an organism-like entity behaves like an 
ecological system has been used as a criterion for it not being an organism (Skillings 2016). As such 
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organisms are used as an implicit, and sometimes explicit, contrast class to ecological systems, but the 
focus of discussion is on the qualities of ecological systems. 
In the following sections, I will outline the extent to which ecological systems satisfy the 
conditions for the four different classes of ecological function described below: Selected Effects 
Functions, Persistence Functions, Causal Roles Functions, and Organizational Functions. For each of 
these I outline and discuss their application to ecology.  
 
3.1. Selected Effects Functions. 
 
In organismal biology the most prominent theory of function is the Selected Effects (SE) 
function. The SE function of a trait, or part, of an organism is the effect(s) that trait has which were 
selected for in previous generations (Neander 1983; Millikan 1984). To use the canonical example, 
the function of the heart in an organism is to pump blood, which in turn helps the organism stay alive 
and produce another organism which has a functioning heart. Paradigm cases of SE functions are the 
roles of individuated sub-systems in organisms. The history of selection on organisms provides a 
privileged and non-arbitrary means to individuate these biological systems and identify their 
biologically significant causal effects. This allows for the ascription of normativity to traits and the 
ability to discern between accidental and functional traits. There are many different causal effects 
organismal sub-systems can have; for example, a beating heart makes a phump-whump sound, which 
is not functional for that organism as it has not been subject to natural selection. “Accidental”, or 
fortuitous new arrangements of a trait, confer an advantage but are not functional. Both fortunate 
accidents and malfunctions are assessed against the historically selected role of the trait. The token 
trait is assessed against the selected trait type, which allows for the normative dimension of functions 
to be identified. The functional trait must act in a historically appropriate way to be functional.  
Natural selection can occur on multiple levels of biological organization and whatever level 
selection occurs at can bear SE functional traits (Godfrey-Smith 1993). If ecological systems are 
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subject to natural selection, then they will possess SE functions1. These ecological systems will need 
to be “Darwinian individuals” (Godfrey-Smith 2009), they cannot be any mereological arrangement. 
The overall community composition must respond to natural selection and form stable lineages, 
reproducing over time. But as Maclaurin and Sterelny (2008) argue, ecological systems do not form 
clear lineages or form Darwinian populations. Populations in a community are not tightly causally 
coupled over extended periods compared to organisms, which have more causally integrated. An 
ecological lineage, multiple populations with consistent causal relationships, being reproduced over 
multiple generations is implausible. The constant rearrangement of the relationships in ecological 
systems obstructs the formation of the long-term relationships required for lineage formation. Even 
when populations cohabitate an area, they are unlikely to have co-evolutionary relationships (Sagoff 
2019).  
Given this, there is a steep hill to climb to establish that there are ecological SE functions. But 
in a limited set of cases, there are plausibly ecological Darwinian populations. Ecological lineages are 
not ubiquitous, but they can exist in the small scale with only a few populations. The most common 
ecological lineages are cases of reciprocal specialisation, in which populations co-evolve to form 
mutualistic relationships. A famous example is the Malagasy Orchid, which Charles Darwin observed 
with its foot-long nectary and hypothesized that there must be a moth with a foot-long proboscis. Four 
decades later Morgan’s Sphinx Moth was discovered with a foot-long proboscis (Kritsky 1991). 
These two species have unique morphologies, which mean they depend on each other for survival. 
They, as a pair, form an ecological lineage, with two populations being recreated in the same causal 
relationship over time. These populations could be recreated in new habitats forming something 
 
1 A fascinating new development is Roberta Millstein’s (forthcoming) thesis that populations have 
ecological selected effects functions even if communities do not undergo natural selection. Co-
evolution provides an ecological function to an organism, it is selected to perform as a ‘parasite’ or 
‘detritivore’ for only a few specific species, which provides the ‘ecological role’ it plays in the larger 
ecological system it belongs to. To my understanding, in this case Millstein is arguing that there is 
‘selection for’ ecological functions without ‘selection of’ ecosystems. Such functional statements may 
be possible, but as of yet I cannot see how to connect these co-evolutionary roles with the larger 
ecological community they sit within; especially when these populations are taken outside of their 
historic ranges. I look forward to further developments of this idea. 
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weakly analogous to reproduction2. Each of them would possess a corresponding SE function for the 
maintenance of this two-population ecological unit. This reciprocal relationship maintains the higher-
level ecological lineage as both need to maintain their causal relationship due to their fitness 
dependency on the other. This strong dependency makes it possible that they as a unit compete with 
other populations for resources. Thus, I consider reciprocal mutualistic relationships as plausibly SE 
functional.  
Reciprocal adaptations are required for SE functions; asymmetrical adaptations are not strong 
enough to create an entity subject to natural selection. The plants in an ecological community will be 
adapted to the provision of sunlight but the sun is not dependent on those plants. Equally, if a tree 
relies on an insect pollinator but that pollinator does not rely on it, we have an asymmetry. Natural 
selection is occurring on the tree, not the whole community of tree and pollinator. Most ecological 
networks are asymmetrical (Rezende et al. 2007; Bastolla et al. 2009). The populations within these 
networks will not have reciprocal adaptations so do not belong to a single selectively sculpted system.  
Ecological systems with SE function will be severely limited. They will only have very few 
populations, who necessarily cohabitate, and border on, or are, symbiotic. Examples will include, 
holobionts and lichens; but even these may not constitute units of selection! (Booth 2014; Skillings 
2016).  Once you expand past such intimate co-evolutionary relationships, the contingencies of 
defection or disappearance become too great. If invasive species disrupt these reciprocal relations, 
they will be ‘malfunctional’. Large scale communities, therefore, do not possess malfunctions. 
Further, without a history of co-evolution invasive species cannot form new functions in novel 





2 This point is up for debate, it depends on what is accepted as the reproduction of a set of lineages. 




3.2. Persistence Functions 
 
Garson (2011; 2017a) and Dussault and Bouchard (2017), in response to the limitations of SE 
functions, expand what counts as selection. They defend two different theories of function through 
differential persistence or retention3. These theories avoid the need for reproduction or lineage 
formation, so they are thought to be more applicable to ecological systems. Dussault and Bouchard 
(2017) state an ecosystem has a function if: 
‘The function of x in an ecosystem E is to F if, and only if, x is capable to doing F and x’s 
capacity to F contributes to E’s propensity to persist’ 
Dussault and Bouchard 2017, p. 1122 
 
The differential persistence theories of function, as it currently stands, cannot be applied to 
ecological systems. This project requires a principled and objective distinction between the 
persistence of an ecological system and its replacement by a new system. The authors of persistence 
theories of function, as of yet, have not provided the resources to be able to apply their theory and this 
will require redress. This is in contrast with the varied attempts to provide principled theories of 
reproduction and lineage formation, which are necessary to identify SE functions (Dawkins 1982; 
Griesemer 2005; Godfrey-Smith 2009). Reproduction and the formation of lineage provide identity 
conditions for SE functional systems. Without similar identity conditions, persistence theories of 
function cannot be applied, as of yet.  
Identity conditions are difficult to provide for ecological systems. If communities are 
idiosyncratic, there is no reference class of community types to identify whether a trait has 
contributed to differential persistence. For example; to identify whether an increase in soil salinity 
allows for the differential persistence of dry sclerophyll forests, we need to look at one dry sclerophyll 
forest with high salinity and compare it to another dry sclerophyll forest with low salinity (which then 
 
3 Differential retention I find more plausible than propensity to persist, but I do not have the space to 
expand on why, so I will consider these accounts together. 
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does not persist)4. For the persistence theory of function to be fruitfully applied, it is not enough for a 
dry sclerophyll forest to continue in roughly the same region. This forest must be the same forest.  
Persistence function proponents must provide identity conditions for ecological communities 
to determine if the system has persisted through internal change. Continued individuality of an 
ecological system requires a notion of growth or reproduction or internal cohesion (where internal 
cohesion is not relying on persistence and therefore circular). This is difficult as ecological 
communities do not appear to have any unified identity conditions, there is nothing that appears to 
unify ecological kinds (for more on ecological identity see Jax et al. 1998; Grimm 1998; Jax 2006). 
Without the identity conditions for community persistence the relevant contrast class for whether a 
trait allowed the community to persist or not cannot be found. For example, to identify if a dry 
sclerophyll forest has persisted due to an increase in soil salinity over a forest in low salinity 
environment, we must be able to answer two questions of identity. Are these two dry sclerophyll 
forests the same and did the dry sclerophyll forest that “persisted” retained its identity over time?  
This is a problem, as dry sclerophyll forests are unique; the Office of Environment and 
Heritage in New South Wales describe ten different dry sclerophyll forests such as the Hunter-
Macleay dry sclerophyll forest, which is dominated by spotted gum, and Upper Riverina dry 
sclerophyll forest, which is dominated by box gum5. As we go to finer and finer grains, there will be 
different species and proportions of species and abiotic facts and causal arrangements of species in 
each of these regions. There is, therefore, no relevant contrast class to identify whether a trait makes a 
difference to persistence6. This differs from organisms where we have a well-established contrast 
 
4 We would further need to identify whether the salt makes an actual causal difference, or whether it is 
some other causal factor, like rainfall or the addition of a population of wedgetail eagles. This is a 
serious epistemic barrier. 
5http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/threatenedSpeciesApp/VegFormation.aspx?formationName=Dr
y+sclerophyll+forests+(shrub%2Fgrass+sub-formation) Accessed 14.08.2019 
 
6  One option is we could indulge in some serious metaphysics and attempt to look at the ecosystem’s 
counterpart in the nearest possible world without that trait (Lewis 1971). I doubt the proponent of this 
version of naturalised function will find this desirable. Even if they do, there are issues with using 




class, the other organisms within that species. These provide naturally occurring replications which 
help identify whether a trait aided in the persistence of that organism. While organismal identity 
conditions are difficult, we at least have good principles for which entities we should compare when 
we try and establish whether an individual persisted.  
Dussault and Bouchard (2017) realize this is a problem, admitting the ‘Heraclitean problem 
of an entity’s sameness through change, is that of the ecosystem’ (p. 24). They concede attempts to 
define ecological identity often result in large disjuncts of different criteria (e.g. Jax et al. 1998). To 
address this problem, they posit that all these different kinds exist, through John Dupré’s 
‘promiscuous realism’, in which any mereological sum is a kind, if it is useful for an agent (Dupré 
1993). Under Dupré’s theory any patch of an ecosystem will consist of many differing overlapping 
ecological systems with different identity conditions. This is problematic for the persistence theory 
of function. Any region will have countless “real” ecological systems, some of which will persist 
under a given change, like invasion, and others that will not. If there are multiple different functional 
ecological kinds within an area, Dussault and Bouchard (2017) must be able to ascribe consistent 
propensities for persistence to each of these kinds. These spatially co-existing propensities will need 
to translate across the different co-extensive ecosystems; they cannot be radically inconsistent. With 
so many different ecological kinds, we will be given an immense disjunction of propensities, each 
representing a different ecosystem present within that patch of land. This leads them to admit 
‘persistence may remain a non-operational concept until some identity conditions are specified’ 
(Dussault & Bouchard, p. 1139). While they can leave this as future work to be done, as it stands, 
they cannot determine what has a function.  
The resources necessary to establish the continuity of a community, given a function part, 
are required for displaying the co-dependency between functional parts and the larger community 
these parts functions for. Otherwise, it is unclear why persisting entities should be described as 
normatively functional. Theories of natural function naturalise the teleology of a system’s parts via 
the role these parts play in the larger system they belong to, but the larger system is usually 
understood to contribute to the existence of the system’s parts as well. In contrast, ecosystem traits 
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which aid the persistence of the ecosystem do not explain how the system influences the ecosystem 
traits’ existence. This is because persistence does not require a feedback loop from the effect of the 
trait on the larger system back to the continued existence of the trait7. The microclimate which aids 
the persistence of an ecological community does not necessarily explain the microclimate. 
Therefore, it is unclear to me what we gain from this broadening of function. Persistence function 
are not without potential to explain some phenomena, but as they stand, they require significantly 
more development.  
 
3.3. Organizational Functions 
 
 A relatively new theory of natural functions is the Organizational (O) function, which 
represent normativity in natural systems without reference to natural selection (Mossio et al. 2009). O 
functions require that systems be structured for self-maintenance: a closed differentiated self-
maintaining organisation. O function proponents equate normativity with self-maintenance, as it is 
for the good of the system. This theory of function has been applied up and down the biological 
hierarchy, describing functional composition in individual organisms and their functionally composed 
sub-systems (Saborido et al. 2011).  
The formalized theory of O function states, a trait T has a function in the organization O of a 
system S if and only if:  
C1: T contributes to the maintenance of organization O of S 
C2: T is produced and maintained under some constraints exerted by O 
C3: S is organizationally differentiated (Mossio et al. 2009, p. 828). 
 
7 Thanks to Kim Sterelny for pressing this point. 
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C1 and C2 are described as combining to identify a system with organizational closure8. This 
is when T maintains O and O maintains T’s presence. C3 articulates organizational differentiation: T 
must be a sub-part of the overall system, with a unique causal profile, rather than the whole system. In 
the case of the heart, the heart is a differentiated subpart of the body, it maintains the body and the 
body constrains and maintains the actions of the heart. Co-dependency between parts and the system 
provides natural normativity. 
Nunes-Neto et al. (2014) argue ecological compositions are O-functional with the example of 
a resource cycle formed within a tropical bromeliad. The spiders that inhabit the bromeliad are 
functional, as their consumption of small insects drops nitrogen into the pool of water formed at the 
bromeliad’s base. The nitrogen sustains the bromeliad and the bromeliad in turn provides a habitat for 
the spiders. This system is centred on an isolated individual plant and the way this plant provides a 
habitat for the species that maintain it. This indicates that the system has organizational closure. 
Organizational differentiation is satisfied as each population acts uniquely in the ecosystem’s causal 
structure. Finally, the resource cycling sustains all the populations within this system, meeting the 
self-maintenance condition.  
Even if the bromeliad system is genuinely self-maintaining, such cases are the exception. 
Notice this system is physically small, only occupying several metres cubed, and its causal actors are 
few and well-defined, only comprising of insects, spiders, and a plant. This limited size and strong 
identity conditions allow O functions to describe self-maintenance over time and avoid the issues of 
persistence functions. O functions are less likely to apply to ecological systems as they scale up in 
their size, complexity, and openness. Invasive species could disrupt O-functions when they interact 
with them, but this is inconsequential, as O-functions are rare and exist on significantly different 
scales to invasive populations. 
 
8 Recently, C2 was reformulated by the main proponents of Organisational functions (Moreno and 
Mossio 2015). I am, however, responding to the version of Organisational functions found within 
Nunes-Neto et al. (2014). Thanks to a reviewer for drawing my attention to this. 
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Why are O functions rare in ecology?  We must look at the conditions for O functions 
separately: organisational differentiation and organisational closure. Both are problematic for a 
general application of O functions to large scale communities. Organisational differentiation requires 
the functional trait be a defined subpart of the system with a distinct causal profile. While it is 
possible to do this, as in the case of the bromeliad, much of ecological phenomena does not involve 
easily differentiated features. Causal closure is even more difficult to satisfy as ecological systems are 
rarely, if ever, closed systems. 
Organisational differentiation requires different distinguishable populations or abiotic 
resources to form parts of a community. Just like in the case of persistence function, we must be able 
to define and identify an ecological system and its parts over time. Topography and geology will 
produce some abiotic bound sub-systems, but demarcating autonomous abiotic ecological systems is 
difficult (Odenbaugh 2010; Post et al. 2007). Text-book depictions of nutrient cycles involve 
incredible amounts of idealization, cramming diffuse multi-factor interactions into a single node, to 
the extent that it is hard to see what they represent. These parts must also provide distinct causal 
profiles. Abiotic units are spatially diffuse, exerting causal control in many ways across the entire 
system at once. Rain can cause plants to grow, fungi to reproduce, animals to disperse, soil to be 
eroded, and insects to drown; each has an impact on the composition of the ecosystem9. Equally, 
populations maintain ecosystems through aggregational properties rather than distinguishable causal 
profiles. Many of the proposed links between stability and diversity go via the aggregation of many 
different populations rather than differentiated sub-parts playing roles. (Sterelny 2005; Dussault and 
Bouchard 2017).  
Organisational closure is even more problematic for applying organisational functions to 
ecosystems. Equating ecological systems with closed self-maintaining unit requires a strong 
commitment to equilibrium ecology. Equilibrium ecology was prominent through the middle of the 
20th century and sought to establish that populations within a community regulate each other’s 
 
9 For more arguments against water cycles being teleological see: Mossio and Bich 2017, p. 1100. 
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abundance (Pimm 1991; Cooper 2003). A classic example is the oscillation of predator and prey 
populations as described in the Lotka-Volterra model. Population interactions were believed to 
stabilize the community composition. When these stabilising interactions are coupled with stable 
population ranges they result in bound self-maintaining ecological systems. 
Equilibrium ecology has experienced extensive criticism through its history (Cooper 2003, p. 
46-55). The contrary view, non-equilibrium ecology, argues that communities are casually open 
collections of species. Local community composition is the product of path-dependent historical 
processes and the random dispersal of populations from other local communities. Local species 
presence or absences are a patchwork of dispersal and local population collapse (Hubbell 2001, p. 8-
9). If this picture is correct ecological communities are not closed systems; they are the product of 
many populations moving around larger biogeographic regions (Ricklefs 2005; Lean and Sterelny 
2016). Due to the large turnover of species within a local area, we will see a change in not just the 
populations playing a functional role but also the overall causal structure of the system. This will 
change the organisation of the system so there is no longer the functional maintenance of the 
ecological system by a population. It is an open empirical question as to which ecological systems are 
subject to non-equilibrium dynamics and which are in equilibrium. Some evidence suggests many arid 
and tropical rainforests exist well away from equilibrium (Sullivan 1996; Hubbell 2001; Ricklefs 
2005). 
O functions will occur in some ecological systems. Generally, they will be small ecological 
systems, with just a couple of populations in close physical proximity. Invasive species, when they 
invade ecosystems, can disrupt whatever O functional systems are present. If the invaders outcompete 
the native species within their O functional communities, invasion will result in the destruction of the 
O function. In such cases, we can state that invasive species are malfunctional for these systems. It is 
possible for the invasive species to form an ecological O function, just unlikely due to the need for 
pre-existing functional correspondence between the invasive population and the native assemblage. 
So, O functional novel ecosystems are possible but rarer and smaller than some may expect. The 
disruption or formation of O functions will, just like SE functions, be uncommon. 
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3.4. Causal Role Functions. 
 
The main competitor to SE functions is the Causal Role (CR) function (Cummins 1975). This 
type of function is explanatory; it explains how a part contributes to a system’s capacity, whatever 
that capacity may be. Within this theory, the function of system sub-part is the systemic capacities, 
and structure organisation, of that sub-part which explain the capacities of the system it belongs to. As 
it is an explanatory relation, it can only describe the presence or absence of a function, not whether 
the trait is malfunctional or accidental. It, therefore, has no normative component; there is no way a 
CR functional system “should” be acting. To have a CR function an ecosystem only needs to be 
causally or constitutively continuous, and it needs to possess a capacity we wish to explain given its 
parts. This theory of function has been applied to ecological systems (Sterelny 2006; Maclaurin & 
Sterelny 2008; Odenbaugh 2010).  
A suitable example of a CR function is Robert Paine’s (1966) experiment of removing the 
starfish Pisaster from intertidal rock pools. Through repeated intervention, he identified that Pisaster 
played a distinct, stable, and unique role in that system. The community described by Paine is built 
from the communities causal relations indexed to a single population: Pisaster. This food web is 
called a sink food web as it is indexed to a predator (the energetic sink) to which the rest of the 
populations are related. Pisaster predates on all the other populations in the community but prefers the 
California Mussel (Mytilus). When Pisaster is removed from the system, the Mussel population 
rapidly increases, spatially excluding all the other species. This causes a collapse in the species 
















The Pisaster population in Paine’s community plays a distinct unique role in the system. But 
what is the role for? We could describe the function as being for the suppression of the mussel 
population but that is not interesting for understanding the overall capacities of that ecological 
community. By suppressing the mussel population, Pisaster maintains the community’s species 
composition, the population network structure, and species richness. Counterfactually, all these 
different ecosystem properties are not identical; we could have variation in one and not the others. All 
of them are interesting, as these dynamics are explanatorily relevant to different scientific hypotheses, 
and we could aim to explain any of them using the CR function framework.  
The flexibility of this theory allows it to explain any ecological system’s capacity, provided 
there are constitutive and causal relations in that community. As the system and capacity of interest is 
explicitly defined by the researcher, CR functions do not suffer from the issues of identity that 
undermine persistence functions. But this flexibility to explain capacities has been seen as a weakness 
by Nunes-Neto et al. (2014) and Dussault and Bouchard (2017). They correctly identify that invasive 
species can be functional for the collapse or fragmentation of an ecological system. For example, the 
feral Goat in Australia removes Australian flora and fauna as it overgrazes Australian plants and 







5.2. The intertidal ecological community. Arrows indicate the flow 
of energy. The different populations are: 1) Pisaster 2) Thais 3) 
Chitons 4) Limpets 5) Bivalves (including Mytilus) 6) Acorn 
Barnacles 7) Mitella. As the apex predator, Pisaster suppresses 




plants (weeds) into the areas through seeds carried in their dung, which can quickly grow in the soil 
Goat’s hooves overturn10. Goats have a systemic set of causal relationships to both the native habitat 
and other invasive species. This creates a novel ecosystem, comprising of weeds and the native plants 
which survive herbivory. Goats do not contribute to the survival of the previously present ecological 
system; they promote their own novel ecosystem.  
The conclusion that invasives, like Goats, causally support their own novel ecological system, 
and this does not count as a malfunction, has led some to argue that CR function’s apply functions to 
causal relations which are counterintuitive to the research aims of community ecology (Dussault & 
Bouchard 2017, p. 1120). That is, because invasive species can be CR ‘functional’, the use of CR 
functions ‘misdiagnose’ malfunctional relationships in ecology. Assuming that invasives are 
malfunctional is a mistake derived from overinterpreting the normative language used to describe 
invasive species (Chew & Laubichler 2003; Brown & Sax 2004). As this theory of function is 
explanatory, we may want to know the causal capacities of invasive species in ecological systems so 
that we may understand what ecosystem features they diminish or promote. We can use functional 
analysis to identify the effects of invasive species, but functional analysis will not tell us whether 
those effects are desirable or not.  
 
4. The Role of ‘Function’ in Conservation 
 
Ecological science has often drifted between two extremes (Cooper 2003; Eliot 2011). On one 
extreme, ecological systems are treated as mere collections of populations, largely independent of 
each other (Gleason 1926). On the other, ecological systems are analogous to organisms, possessing 
functional organisation that maintains mature organism-like individuals (Clements 1916). If 
ecological systems are organism-like they will have functions from which conclusive statements 
 
10  Australian Government Invasive Species Fact Sheet 
https://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive-species/publications/factsheet-feral-goat-
capra-hircus Accessed 14.08.2019 
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about what is normatively functional or malfunctional can be made. The picture I have presented sits 
between the extremes. Ecological systems have complex causal relationships, but they are rarely self-
maintaining or evolutionary entities (Lean 2018). The large-scale communities which feature in 
conservation decision making will not possess normative functions. Therefore, invasive species are 
not malfunctional for ecological communities in the same manner as infectious diseases are for the 
organisms they infect. 
This, however, is no great loss. Founding conservation on teleology is a misstep. The 
teleological arrangement of ecological systems is extremely spotty. There are little blips of 
teleological arrangement, but these are not strong enough to support an entire conservation ethic. 
Teleological composition does not include much of the phenomena conservation aims to protect, 
specifically, biology beyond organisms. For this reason, focusing on interests or welfare is not the 
right way to do conservation (Basl 2019). The most teleologically arranged entities will always be 
individual organisms not populations or ecosystems. Any calculus that weighs overall welfare, as the 
means of determining their overall value, will describe individual organisms as the most deserving. 
Further, the realization the biological individuality come in degrees has led to philosophers 
considering the extent to which organisms are functionally integrated (Clarke 2011; Godfrey-Smith 
2012; Skillings 2016). Organisms could be understood as having different potentials for experiencing 
degrees of welfare according to the degree of their functional arrangement. 
The reliance on functional organization to ground ethical consideration ignores the targets of 
conservation which are above the level of individual organisms, and it does not capture the 
uniqueness of organisms past their functional integration. This I would categorize as a poor 
conceptual analysis of our ethical relationship to nature, as it misses the features conservationists aim 
to preserve (Soulé 1985). A teleological focus in conservation will yield counterintuitive results. It is 
widely known that welfare of organisms often trades-off against conservation interests (Sagoff 1984). 
If we only want to promote functional entities, we would prioritise well organised organisms creating 
a ‘functional chauvinism’ like the ‘sentience chauvinism’ Peter Singer’s animal liberationist ethical 
theory is often accused of (Colyvan et al. 2009; Singer 1975). Given there is more to conservation 
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than functionally integrated organisms, I think that we should look elsewhere for our ethical 
justification. 
Despite the lack of teleology in ecological systems, there are resources available in the 
function literature for conservation. CR functions inform us how a system works and this in turn will 
constrain what we can do. By deploying CR functional analysis, we can identify what supports the 
ecological features that we do, or should want to, protect. These could be features of the environment 
which have moral utility or preference. While this does not offer us a non-anthropocentric justification 
for intervening on ecological communities, it does offer a way of identifying which populations make 
a disproportionate impact on the community. Large impacts will affect more individual components 
of that system, which people may have an interest in preserving. If these large impacts negatively 
influence many of these individual components people value, then we should act to stop them. With 
such tools in hand we can better compare the impact of conservation decisions on the environmental 
feature of interest to opposing parties. Different modes of injecting normativity into the causal nodes 
of ecosystem structure, the individual populations that form the ecological community’s causal 
network, will play a role in deciding whether we should control invasive species (Lean 2018).  
To display the utility of CR functions in conservation, I present one way we can introduce 
normativity into this causal structure, which provides guidance for how we should act towards 
invasive species. Populations that are CR functional for biodiversity should be supported and invasive 
species which act to diminish biodiversity should be controlled. Biodiversity is a feature most 
conservationists aim to preserve and, insofar as we should preserve biodiversity, we should support 
invasive species control as invasive species reduce global biodiversity (Clavero & García-Berthou 
2005). This is not the only way to introduce features of normative worth into this causal analysis, 
other principles could be used to identify features of value to humanity. For example: we may want to 
preserve areas which provide ecosystem services, or goods of immediate economic value. Immediate 
economic value is a common currency and may allow for some leeway in complex negotiations. I 
focus on biodiversity because, as I explain in the next section, there are multiple intersecting reasons 
to preserves it and there are indisputable cases where it is negatively affected by invasive species. 
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5. Functions for Biodiversity 
 
There are multiple intersecting motivations for preserving biodiversity, which provide a 
strong case for controlling invasive species when they reduce biodiversity. Biodiversity preservation 
is a common aim for much of conservation (Soulé 1985; Sarkar 2012; Lean 2017). Biodiversity is 
often touted as promoting ecosystem services. Within this literature, biodiversity is CR functional for 
ecosystem services as it is described as causing features of economic utility11 (e.g. Mace et al. 2012). 
But unique to biodiversity preservation is that it promotes option value (Faith 1992; Nehring & Puppe 
2002; Maclaurin & Sterelny 2008). Preserving unique species provides different options in that their 
unique capacities are or could be of value. Option value is a type of prudential reasoning; we wish to 
keep resources available for future use. Insofar as we should act prudentially, or it is rational to act 
prudentially, we should preserve option value. There is a question of how much we should invest in 
options, as opposed to immediate preferences. Such questions will require decision-making under 
risk, and agents’ decisions about how much risk they wish to take. Given most agents will reasonably 
view alleviating risk and preserving opportunities as an important motivator, they will want to 
promote biodiversity. 
Biodiversity thus creates conservation priorities. We can identify the ecological features that 
maintain or promote these biodiverse populations using the CR function framework. If invasive 
species threaten populations that are CR functional for biodiversity, then we have reason to control 
them. This framework mirrors the way conservationists often discuss the problem of invasive species. 
Not all exotic species are controlled; species that are described as invasive are done so under the 
assumption they have a large impact on other populations or economic services (see Young and 
Larson 2011). It is the invasive populations that actively reduce the unique local biodiversity that 
most conservations aim to control, and the CR functional framework can act to clarify these 
 
11 Thanks to David Frank for this point. 
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relationships. An example of the relationship between regional biodiversity and invasive species can 
be found in Southern Queensland. 
The Southern Cassowary is a species of 1.8m tall birds found throughout Southern 
Queensland. These large and dangerous birds are in themselves quite evolutionarily distinct and 
contribute to biodiversity as their own population’s self-maintenance reflexively preserves 
biodiversity. Cassowaries play a further critical role in preserving more biodiversity within the 
rainforests they inhabit. They are megafaunal dispersers, or large animals that stand in a mutualistic 
relationship with plant species (Guimarães Jr et al. 2008; Janzen & Martin 1982). Many plants have 
large seeds and fruit made for megafauna to consume, transport, and fertilize. With the spread of 
humans, who excel at hunting megafauna, there has been a gigantic diminution of megafauna 
worldwide. Some mutualistic plants, like the avocado, have avoided extinction by being appealing to 
humans, but many plants have become extinct through the knock-on effects of losing their dispersers.  
In the Cape York Peninsula rainforest, the Cassowary acts as the only local megafaunal 
disperser, dispersing the seeds of 78 species of plant (Stocker & Irvine 1983). These seeds are of 
unique and distinct lineages of plants that contribute to biodiversity. Cassowaries make a distinct and 
persistent contribution to the maintenance of these systems as one of the world’s rare remaining avian 
megafaunal dispersers. To preserve the plants that comprise the rainforest we need to preserve the 
Cassowary population on which they all causally depend. The unique contribution of Cassowaries to 
biodiversity justifies the control of invasive populations which threaten their existence. Feral pigs 
negatively affect Cassowary populations (Chrome & Moore 1990). Pigs destroy cassowary nests, 
eating both eggs and chicks. By consuming ground fruit, they also compete with Cassowaries for 
food. Pigs make a stable casual contribution to the reduction of biodiversity within the North-Eastern 
Queensland rainforests. 
Using CR functions, we can move from a system capacity, the maintenance of biodiversity in 
a community, to the causal structure that supports them. Equally we can identify which populations 
act to diminish biodiversity. Functional units can be a single population or set of populations weakly 
acting in unison to create a robust system capacity. In all these cases CR functions describe how these 
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complex systems, once specified clearly, are maintained and give us clear instructions which 
populations threaten these systems. 
The invasive species discussed by conservationists are those we have strong evidence for 
them negatively impacting local populations, like feral pigs. These are the populations that we 
currently tend to control, and I believe we should continue to do so. We both want the ecosystem 
services higher levels of biodiversity provide and to preserve biodiversity due to prudential reasons. 
These prudential reasons will be shared by most rational agents, and thereby, provide a bridge for 
negotiating the debate over invasive species. As such, there are reasons to eradicate invasive species 




Ecological function cannot do the heavy lifting some have wanted it to do. Ecological systems 
do not hold together in a way which will permit large scale normative functions, which require 
replication or self-maintenance. Instead, we see causally connected systems with pockets of 
functionally arranged populations, be these of the replicating or self-maintaining type. We are, 
however, left with resources to sort through the causal structure and identify the features we value 
today as well as those which provide option value for the future. This will go part of the way to 
providing mediation in these disputes. However, I fear much of the work will have to be done at the 
level of social and political discussion. 
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